Health insurance benefit mandates are believed to have adverse effects on the labor market, but efforts to document such effects for mental health parity mandates have had limited success.
Introduction
The number of health insurance benefit mandates has increased significantly in recent years (CAHI, 2012) . Part of the growth reflects the fact that mandates are a more efficient way for the government to provide specific benefits to employed individuals compared to public delivery financed by distortionary taxation (Gruber and Krueger, 1991; Summers, 1989 ). Yet these mandates function as a tax on labor and yield an inward shift in the labor demand curve that may be offset by a shift in the labor supply curve if workers value the mandated benefit (Summers, 1989) . 1 Consistent with the Summers' model, broad mandates that affect all employees, such as workers compensation insurance and mandates to have health insurance coverage, appear to reduce wages (Fishback and Kantor, 1995; Gruber and Krueger, 1991; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012) .
Estimates of the effects of health insurance benefit mandates are more varied. Gruber (1994a) studies state and federal mandates that health insurance plans provide maternity coverage demonstrating that married women of child-bearing age had lower wages after the mandate than before, relative to a variety of control groups. Along similar lines, Lahey (2012) demonstrated that infertility benefit mandates reduced the labor supply of older women, but did not affect wages, while Bitler and Schmidt (2012) show that these mandates affect utilization of infertility treatment. However, several other studies of health insurance benefit mandates have failed to document effects of benefit mandates on wages, labor supply, insurance coverage, or utilization of the mandated benefit (e.g. Bao and Sturm, 2004; Cseh, 2008; Gruber, 1994b; Kaestner and Simon, 2002; Pacula and Sturm, 2000) . I use repeated cross-sections from the 1997-2001 National Health Interview Survey to study how mental health parity mandates affect employment, insurance coverage, earnings, and labor supply.
I allow the effect of parity mandates to vary by mental distress since more distressed individuals should benefit more from parity mandates. 2 I measure mental distress using six items about feelings in the past thirty days (Kessler et al., 2002 (Kessler et al., , 2003 . Because the overall distress score may fall after a mandate takes effect, I instrument for the full six item score using four of the six items that appear to be unaffected by the mandate.
I find that the association between parity mandates and employment, insurance coverage, earnings, and hours worked varies in substantive ways with mental distress. Generally, parity mandates are associated with adverse outcomes for non-distressed individuals, reflecting the fact that these mandates may be costly and are not valued by non-distressed individuals. However, for the ten 1 An important caveat is that the Summers' model, strictly speaking, only applies to mandates that impose an hourly cost, but health insurance benefit mandates may affect the fixed cost of employment, which will result in firms demanding additional hours worked from a smaller number of employees (Cutler and Madrian, 1998; Feldman, 1993) .
2 Many previous studies of benefit mandates have used various interactions to account for heterogeneous benefits of mandates across groups (Bitler and Schmidt, 2012; Gruber, 1994a; Lahey, 2012) . In the mental health arena it has become common to include interactions with indicators of mental health to reflect the heterogeneous benefits of mental health benefit mandates (Bao and Sturm, 2004; Barry and Busch, 2007; Busch and Barry, 2008; Harris et al., 2006) . percent of the population in worst distress, I find significant beneficial effects of parity mandates.
For those who have clinically significant mental distress (2.6% of the population), the parity mandate is associated with a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability of being employed, an 8.6 percentage point increase in the probability of working at a firm that offers health insurance, and a 5.3 percentage point increase in the probability of having any employer sponsored insurance. 3 Labor market effects are similarly large, with mentally distressed individuals having earning that are almost 16 log points higher after a mandate takes effect, most of which is due to an increase in hours worked. These results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications and to using different items of the distress score to measure distress and are significantly larger and of the opposite sign as the effects on pseudo-mandates that take effect three years before the actual mandates.
Background 2.1 Labor market effects of mental illness
There is a large body of evidence demonstrating that poor mental health is associated with worse labor market outcomes. Bartel and Taubman (1979, 1986) find that mental illness is associated with substantially lower wages, labor supply, and employment probability in a sample of twins; in the aggregate, mental illness is associated with up to a 50% decline in earnings, compared to what an individual with comparable experience and education. Using the National Comorbidity Survey, Ettner et al. (1997) estimates instrumental variable models of the effect of any psychiatric disorder, using as instruments the disorders experienced by one's parents and the number of disorders experienced in youth; their results demonstrate that having a psychiatric disorder is associated with a lower likelihood of employment and 10-30% lower earnings, conditional on employment. Chatterji et al. (2011 Chatterji et al. ( , 2007 use data from the National Latino and Asian American Study and the National Comorbidity Survey-Replication to estimate the adverse consequences of a diagnosed mental illness and mental distress. Their estimates indicate that a diagnosed psychiatric disorder reduces the probability of employment by 5-20 percentage points, but they find no evidence that mental illness or distress affects wages or hours worked. Frank and Gertler (1991) consider how measurement of mental health affects the association with earnings; using two different indicators of mental distress, including a population-based survey measure that is similar to the measure I use, indicate that poor mental health was associated with a 22% reduction in log earnings (in separate regressions).
In addition to these effects on employment, wages, or hours worked, mental health is also associated more directly with productivity on the job. Berndt et al. (1998) uses data from a clinical trial of a depression treatment and obtains suggestive evidence that individuals report improved work performance following treatment and that this improvement is correlated with reductions in the severity of their symptoms.
Regulation of Mental Health Benefits
Historically, employers and Medicare 4 have provided less generous insurance coverage for mental health than for physical health conditions. There a variety of reasons given for the differential treatment of mental and physical health conditions including stigma, beliefs that mental illnesses are somehow less "real" than physical illnesses, employer fears of adverse selection (McGuire and Montgomery, 1982) , and more elastic demand for mental health treatment (Newhouse, 1993) .
Beginning in the 1970s, state policymakers responded with requirements that insurance companies at least offer mental health benefits and in most cases these mandates neither applied to employers nor regulated cost-sharing and other aspects of the mental health benefit. Since the early 1990s, states have taken a more aggressive stand on mental health benefits by passing mandates that affect both employers and insurers and regulate the financial terms of the mental health benefit, often by requiring equal cost-sharing for mental and physical health benefits (referred to as "mental health parity"). In the period that I study-1997 through 2001-32 states enact a mental health benefit mandate with 15 of these laws establishing mental health parity. 5 In 1996
Congress established a federal mental health parity mandate which required that those employers that choose to offer mental health coverage cannot discriminate with respect to annual or lifetime benefit limits, but otherwise the law left employers free to design mental health benefits as they saw fit (Gitterman et al., 2001 ).
In most cases, state mental health parity mandates require insurance plans offered by employers to provide coverage of mental illness on financial terms that are comparable to coverage for physical illness-that means uniform copayments or coinsurance rates, mental health visit limits that are as great or greater than visit limits for physical health needs, and identical out-of-pocket, annual, and lifetime maximums. Yet these laws do not affect all firms in a state. Many laws exempt firms that are below a certain size threshold-often between ten and fifty employees-or for which health insurance premiums are one or more percent higher because of the mandated mental health benefits.
Finally, state mandates may not apply to all health insurance plans offered by a firm since firms may self-insure an insurance plan, in which case the plan is exempt from state regulation under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (Acs et al., 1996) . 6 Collectively the exemptions built into state law and the preemption of state parity mandates by ERISA implies that less than the entire population of a state will be affected by a state mandate. 7 4 Medicare only implemented mental health parity beginning in 2014; prior to that point, coinsurance for mental health care was two and a half times larger than coinsurance for general health care (50% vs 20%).
5 Due to data availability issues, I am only able to study six of these laws.
6 The probability that a firm self-insures one or more plans increases with firm size; 13% of employees of firms with fewer than 200 employees, 51% of employees for firms with 200 to 999 employees, and 62% of employees of firms with 1,000 or more employees chose a self-insured plan (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011) .
7 Using data from the Medical Expenditure Survey -Insurance Component, Buchmueller et al. (2007) estimates that less than 50% of workers with employer sponsored health insurance will be directly affected by a state mental As a result of ERISA and the various size and cost exemptions built into mental health parity mandates, many firms in a state with a mandate will not actually be subject to the mandate. The effect of ERISA and any cost exemptions on the estimated effect of parity mandates corresponds to measurement error, in which case estimates of the effect of parity mandates will be attenuated towards zero and hypothesis tests of the effect of a benefit mandate will be underpowered (Wooldridge, 2002; Zuvekas, 2000) . Two solutions have been employed in the literature, which can be described as the "small firms" and "all firms" strategies. The "small firms" strategy restricts to individuals who are employed at smaller firms (Cseh, 2008; Gruber, 1994b; Jensen and Gabel, 1992; Kaestner and Simon, 2002 , are examples of this strategy), where the probability that a firm is self-insured is smaller (note that size exemptions built into mandate laws can be accounted for with suitable data, see Cseh (2008) ). 8 However, such a solution implies that one cannot evaluate the effect of mandates on employment, since the sample must be employed in order for firm size to be known, hence the "small firms" approach (may) reduces measurement error at the cost of introducing selection bias. 9 The alternative, "all firms" strategy, accepts the presence of measurement error the bias from which, at least in the classical case, can be signed, in order to avoid the uncertain effects of selection bias (examples of the "all firm" straetegy include Bitler and Schmidt, 2012; Gruber, 1994a; Lahey, 2012) . For this paper, I adopt the "all firms" strategy.
Effects of Mental Health Benefit Mandates
Early studies of the effects of mental health mandates found no effect of such mandates on the likelihood that a firm offers health insurance coverage (Jensen and Gabel, 1992) or that employees of small firms have health insurance coverage (Gruber, 1994b) in the middle of the 1980s. However, mandates were associated with firms being more likely to offer a self-insured plan in the early 1980s (Jensen et al., 1995) . Gruber (1994b) argues that these negative finding reflect the fact that many of these mandates were not binding since firms already offered the mandated benefit. 10 More recent studies have not found statistically significant associations between insurance coverage and parity mandates (Cseh, 2008; Sturm, 2000) , but mentally distressed individuals perceive their insurance to be better after a parity mandate is enacted (Bao and Sturm, 2004) .
Early evidence on the utilization effects of parity mandates suggested that parity actually health benefit mandate.
8 Zuvekas (2000) makes the case for the "small firm" strategy arguing that power considerations should lead one to restrict the sample to individuals who are most likely to be affected.
9 Suppose that workers receive their marginal products in total compensation and that the true effect of a mandate is to increase the cost of health insurance, which reduces wages for workers at smaller firms. If less productive workers leave smaller firms as a result, while more productive workers remain, then the difference in wages with versus without the mandate can take any sign. Kapur (2004) and Kapur et al. (2008) provide evidence that firms choose their size and that smaller firms are less likely to hire and more likely to separate from sicker workers, in which case the effect of mandate on smaller firms will be smaller than anticipated because firms have other, non-wage margins with which to respond.
10 An interesting finding in Gruber's data (1994b, table 7) is that mandates increased mental health coverage in both large and small firms. worsened access to mental health care, although individuals in the greatest distress may have increased the number of visits conditional on seeing a mental health provider (Bao and Sturm, 2004; Pacula and Sturm, 2000) . Sturm and Pacula (1999) notes that one reason for a lower probability of accessing care in parity states is that those states had lower levels of utilization of mental health care before they enacted parity mandates as well. These negative findings are, partially, replicated by Klick and Markowitz (2006) who note that an effective mental health benefit mandate should reduce suicides, but find little evidence that various types of mental health benefit mandates are effective.
A more recent series of studies look at the wave of mandates that took effect since 1996 and, in particular from 2000 on. In this period, mental health parity mandates appear to have stronger effects on utilization for employees of smaller firms and for individuals in worse mental distress (Busch and Barry, 2008) , reduce the likelihood of high out-of-pocket spending (Barry and Busch, 2007) , increases access to mental health care for more distressed individuals (Harris et al., 2006) , and reduces suicide rates (Lang, 2013 ). Yet, during this period there is no evidence that these mandates adversely affected earnings, insurance coverage, or labor supply of workers of smaller firms (Cseh, 2008 ).
An alternative to the state-based samples, which suffer from measurement error in identifying treatment, is a series of case studies of employers, which may increase selection bias. Goldman et al. (2006) However, the FEHBP plans changed considerably in response to the parity mandate with many of the plans switching from insuring the mental health benefit directly to employing specialized managed behavioral health organizations that tend to reduce mental health utilization (Frank and Garfield, 2007; Zuvekas et al., 2002) . Zuvekas et al. (2002) presents a second case-study from implementing mental health parity in an employer setting, finding that parity combined with managed behavioral health care was associated with a large reduction in spending on mental health and substance abuse services, compared to firms that did not implement parity. However, this reduction in spending is related to a sharp decline in inpatient mental health service utilization in the treatment group, lower baseline mental health services utilization in the comparison group, and was limited to inpatient services. [tk-so what?] On balance, there is reason to believe that early estimates of the effects of mental health benefit mandates are no longer relevant as the types of mandates being passed changed considerably from the 1980s through the early 2000s. In addition, most studies restricted the analysis to employees of smaller firms or employees of a single firm. The smaller firm studies support an effect of parity mandates on mental health care utilization, financial risk protection, and access to care, but there was no evidence of an effect on the labor market. Case studies using changes in single employers are consistent with mental health parity having no effect on utilization, which provides one explanation for the persistent lack of an effect of parity mandates on insurance coverage and the labor market. The NHIS collects information on current insurance coverage, employment, and usual weekly hours, and earnings, income, and months worked in the previous calendar year for all members of the household, which can include multiple families. An individual has health insurance from anyone's employer if the individual reports having a private health insurance policy from an employer or union and has coverage from her own employer if the policy is provided by her employer or union and they employer or union contributes towards the cost of coverage. In addition to the main NHIS files, the CDC has prepared supplementary files that contain continuous imputed wage income from the previous calendar year, which I use to construct a measure of wages based on the average wage income from five sets of imputations. I construct the wage by dividing mean imputed earnings for the previous calendar year by the number of months worked that year times four weeks per month times usual weekly hours in the current year. In order to exclude a small handful of outliers, I trim the wage distribution at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles of the wage distribution. I convert both earnings and the nominal wage into real 2010 dollars using the CPI-U from the prior calendar year (i.e. from the reference period for the earnings question). Because the wage measure is constructed from a combination of current year and previous calendar year data I drop individuals living in a state in the year that a parity mandate was implemented. I exclude individuals who are 65 or older since they are eligible for Medicare coverage, which provides minimal mental health coverage during this period and is unaffected by state parity mandates. I include both hourly and salaried workers in my main sample, but investigate the effects of mandates on each type of worker separately in a sensitivity.
One member of each family is also selected as a "sample adult" who is asked a more detailed set of questions, including questions on mental distress (see the subsection Measuring Mental Distress, below, for details on the mental distress questions).
To the NHIS data, I append data on state mental health regulations, based on Lang (2013), to indicate the presence of a mental health parity mandate. 13 I then classify each state as always having a parity mandate between 1997 and 2001, as enacting a parity mandate between 1997 and 2001, or never having a parity mandate in those years (which I refer to as "state types" below). Table 1 presents summary statistics on my sample, weighted by the inverse of the probability of being selected to be a "sample adult" for individuals in each of the three types of states and preversus post-enactment of parity in the states that have a policy change. Individuals in states that will eventually adopt a parity mandate are similar to individuals in states that will not adopt a parity mandate, with the exception of the geographic, and consequently the racial/ethnic, breakdown, and a lower rate of insurance coverage. A similar comparison between individuals in "Change" states after the mandate takes effect and individuals for whom a mandate was in effect by 1997 indicates substantial differences on almost every margin-mental distress, employment, wages and earnings, and health insurance coverage. The educational, geographic, and racial/ethnic breakdown are again quite different, reflecting faster adoption of parity in Midwestern and Southern states than in the rest of the nation.
Empirical Approach
Adapting the approach in Wolfers (2006) , I first test for "pre-trends" in my outcome variables by regressing mental distress and other outcomes-employment, insurance coverage, and earnings, wages, and hours worked-on demographic characteristics, state, month, and year fixed effects, and time since (to) a parity mandate:
Where O ismt is an outcome for individual i in state s during month m of yeart. Y ears to P arity measures the number of years until a parity mandate takes effect, X i is a vector of individual covariates-age, marital status, race/ethnicity, educational achievement, and self-rated health status-and σ s , µ m , and τ t are state, month, and year fixed effects.
In my main analysis, I use a triple-difference specification for individual i in state s, month m, and year t. The differences arise from comparing individuals in states that have a mandate in effect 13 The states in my data that have a mental health parity mandate (month and year of implementation in parentheses) are California prior to 1997, those that enact a mandate between 1997 and 2001, and states that do not have a parity mandate in effect by 2001, before versus after the parity mandate is implemented, and at greater or lower levels of mental distress. For outcome O i , the specification is:
Where M andate st is a dummy for living in a state with a mental health parity mandate, Distress i is individual i's level of mental distress (described below), Changer s is an indicator for the individual living in a state that will enact a policy change, Always s is an indicator that the state implemented mental health parity prior to 1997, X i is as in (1) and σ s , µ m , and τ t are state, month, and year fixed effects. The state fixed effects eliminate the main effects of Changer s and Always s and also eliminate the interaction between M andate st and Always s . The interactions between state-types and mental distress control for pre-existing differences in the association between mental distress and the outcome.
The result is that β 1 and β 5 measure the association between a parity mandate and the outcomes.
When I constrain β 2 = β 3 = β 4 = β 5 = 0, β 1 is identified under the standard assumptions for differences-in-differences: the trend in the outcome variable in the treatment group would be identical to the trend in the control group, but for the introduction of the parity mandate. The control group in this case consists of those states that will not adopt a parity mandate by 2001 and I test for pre-trends using the α t coefficients estimated from (1). In the absence of the constraints on β 2 , β 3 , β 4 , and β 5 , β 1 measures the association between the parity mandate and the outcome variable for individuals who have no mental distress; unlike in the difference-in-difference case, β 1 does not have a causal interpretation because the composition of the non-distressed subsample may be affected by the mandate-i.e. mental distress may be reduced by the mandate. β 5 estimates how the association between the outcome and the mandate varies with changes in mental distress. As was the case with β 1 under these circumstances, it is not possible to assign a causal interpretation to β 5 and OLS estimates of β 5 are likely to be biased away from zero if the mandate reduces mental distress. In the next section I describe my approach to reduce the bias in the OLS estimates using components of the distress score that are uncorrelated with parity mandates as instruments for the actual distress score.
Because estimates of labor market outcomes-log earnings, log hours worked, and log wagesare censored for individuals who do not work, I also estimate Poisson models, which allow individuals who are not employed, hence have earnings, hours, and wages of zero, to be included in the sample.
The Poisson model is the natural choice of non-linear models because of the exponential mean structure, which is equivalent to a log-linear structure and because there exist GMM estimation methods that allow for endogeneity (Mullahy, 1997) . 14 Because the policy that I study varies at the state-level, I construct covariance matrices assuming that the error terms in (1) and (2) are correlated within states (Bertrand et al., 2006) . However, because of the geographic distribution of MSAs, I only have 25 states in my sample, so I calculate p-values using a t-distribution with G − 2 degrees of freedom, where G is the number of clusters (typically 25) (Cameron et al., 2008) .
For binary outcomes-employment, offered health insurance, and having health insurance from any employer-I estimate both Probit and linear probability models. In order to interpret the Probit coefficients I then estimate marginal effects using the approach outlines in Ai and Norton (2003) . 15
Measuring Mental Distress
The NHIS includes the six item Kessler scale as a measure of mental distress. This scale was designed for use in the NHIS and has been adapted for use in other surveys. As part of the development process, a validation study was undertaken that compared the predictive accuracy of the six item scale with clinical diagnoses using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (Kessler et al., 2002) , which is the gold standard for diagnosis in psychiatry. The validation study indicated that the six item score is predictive of mental distress, with an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of 0.879, which is the probability that a randomly chosen individual with a clinically diagnosed mental illness scores higher than a randomly chosen individual without such a diagnosis (Obuchowski, 2003) . The six items ask individuals how often, during the past thirty days, an individual felt: nervous; hopeless; restless or fidgety; so depressed that nothing could cheer you up (simplified to "sad" in the NHIS); that everything was an effort; and worthless.
The individual can choose among: all of the time; most of the time; some of the time; little of the time; or none of the time. The original items were scored on the basis of item-response theory, which provides weights for the likelihood of a clinical diagnosis for each response pattern, however, these weights are roughly linear, so it has become common to simply score each item from 0 to 4, with 0 corresponding to none of the time, while 4 corresponds to all of the time and construct a six item score as the sum of the individual item scores.
A concern with the mental distress scale is that parity mandates may affect an individual's mental distress and existing evidence on the effectiveness of such mandates suggests that could be the case (Lang, 2013) . If the mandate does affect distress scores, then OLS estimates of (2) would be biased because the error term would include the treatment effect of the mandate on distress. In order to test for this bias, I estimated OLS and ordered probit regressions of both the item-specific scores and the six item score on the mandate dummy and the controls included in (2). Table 2 presents the estimated coefficient on the mandate dummy for these specifications; I excluded the twelve months preceding when a mandate took effect. The results indicate that the mandate significantly affects one of the six items at the ten percent level: that everything was an effort. However, both restlessness and the six item score itself yielded point estimates that were comparatively large and negative, so I cannot ignore the possibility that mental distress is endogenous. One solution to the endogeneity problem is to instrument for mental distress with one or more instrumental variables, which are not affected by the mandate, but are correlated with an individual's distress (Wooldridge, 2002) . Previous studies have used family history of mental illness, childhood mental illness, or religiosity as instruments for the presence of current psychiatric disorders or mental distress (Chatterji et al., 2007; Ettner et al., 1997) . Unfortunately, the NHIS data I use do not include these measures, nor is it clear that such measures are appropriate instruments since they may affect, among other things, human capital accumulation (Chatterji et al., 2011) .
However, four of the items from the Kessler distress scale-nervousness, hopelessness, sadness, and worthlessness-were not affected by the parity mandates that I study, 16 hence these items are candidate instruments for mental distress, provided that they are correlated with overall mental distress and can be excluded from the second-stage of the regression. For the instrument, I constructed a four item score by summing the scores on the four items. The four item score is highly correlated with the remaining two items of the distress score, with a correlation coefficient of 0.73 that is significant at the less than 0.001 level. A regression of the six item score on the instrument yields a coefficient of 1.51 (se=0.0045), which is highly significant and I can reject equality with
Results

Pre-trends
I begin by looking for trends in mental distress 17 and my outcome variables around the time that a state implements a mandate. Figure 1 graphs the α t coefficients from (1). The pre-trends are generally close to zero and in all cases the 95% confidence interval includes zero before the mandate takes effect. 18 Testing the joint hypothesis that the pre-trend coefficients for four to one year before the mandate takes effect equals zero rejects at the five percent level for employment, being offered health insurance, having health insurance from any employer, log earnings, log wages, and log hours. However, I am unable to reject the presence of a pre-trend for either of the two mental distress scores. 19 Appendix figure A1 presents similar graphs for the six mental distress items; only sadness exhibits a pre-trend that is significant at the five percent level. Table 3 presents difference-in-difference (columns 1 and 4) and triple-difference (columns 2-3, 5-7) estimates of (2) for employment and insurance-related outcomes. The first three columns use a linear probability model, columns (4)-(6) report average partial effects from Probit and IV-Probit estimates, using the method in Ai and Norton (2003) , and column (7) presents unweighted LPM results. The second column in the LPM and Probit sets of results assume that mental distress is exogenous, while the third column in the set measures mental distress using the four items that were not (substantially) affected by the mandate and then rescales the reduced form coefficients using an IV approach. To the extent that there is less measurement error in the four items that were unaffected by the mandate than in the remaining two items, the main effect of mental distress will be attenuated, hence smaller in absolute value in the second column than the third in each trio, while the effect of the mandate would bias the the mandate-by-distress interaction away from zero, 20 so the interaction effect should be larger in the second than in the third column.
Employment and Insurance Coverage
Panel A demonstrates that parity mandates may be associated with a reduction in employment, but, if so, the effect is imprecisely estimated and only marginally significant in the difference-indifference specification. Allowing for heterogeneity by mental distress indicates that there is a negative association between mental distress and employment and size of the effect is consistent with some previous estimates. For example, the negative association between distress and employment implies that a one standard deviation (3.6 points) increase in mental distress is associated with a 4.7 to 5.6 percentage point reduction in the probability of being employed (column 3), which is similar to the effect of a one standard deviation increase in a ten-item version of the distress scale that was used in Chatterji et al. (2007) . The negative association between distress and employment is weaker after a parity mandate takes effect, implying that parity is associated with an increase in employment for individuals whose distress score exceeds four to six points, or roughly 11-17% of the population. 21 For the average individual with a clinically significant mental illness (typically defined by having a six item score greater than 12; average distress for this subgroup is 16.75 points), the mandate is associated with a seven percentage point increase in the probability of being employed (p=0.052). The final column indicates that these results on employment are sensitive to the use of sampling weights. Because the NHIS oversamples Black and Hispanic individuals, the implication is that the results are stronger for white individuals.
Panels B and C indicate that there is no effect of the parity mandate on insurance coverageeither measured as the probability of being offered health insurance or the probability of being covered by anyone's employer. However, as was the case with the employment results, I find a negative association for non-distressed individuals that turns positive for sufficiently distressed individuals for both outcomes (distress score greater than four to five points). Because these results do not condition on employment status, part of the observed change in both the offer rate and coverage by employer-sponsored health insurance could reflect a reduction in the share of non-distressed individuals in the workforce, holding employer behavior constant. Estimates that restrict to employed individuals (not shown) yield smaller coefficients for mental distress and its interaction with the mandate, suggesting that the majority of the effect of mental distress on the rate at which individuals are offered health insurance coverage arises from changes in employment, rather than changes in the rate at which employers offer health insurance coverage. 22 It is worth noting, as well, that in the IV-LPM estimates for having employer-sponsored health insurance, I find no evidence that the mandate is associated with non-distressed individuals losing health insurance coverage, but there is a statistically significant positive interaction between distress and the mandate, implying that individuals who are at greater distress are more likely to have health insurance from an employer after the mandate than before the mandate took effect. Table 4 presents similar estimates for labor market outcomes-annual and hourly earnings and annual hours worked. The first three columns present linear regression estimates of the log of the dependent variable, the second set of three columns use Poisson regression to circumvent the fact 21 All references to distress in the population use the distribution of mental distress in states that do not adopt a parity mandate before 2001, so as to avoid confounding these estimates with any changes in the distribution of mental distress as a result of the mandate itself.
22 Such an interpretation is consistent with "small firms" analysis (e.g. Cseh, 2008 ) that find no effect of parity mandates on insurance coverage since those analyses are not affected by changes in employment.
that the log transformation is not defined for individuals who are not in the labor force, column (7) uses a levels, rather than log, specification, and column (8) provides unweighted results to compare with column (3). Panel A demonstrates that parity mandates reduce earnings, on average, with a particularly large negative association for individuals who are not mentally distressed. These results stand in contrast with the prior literature (Cseh, 2008) due, in part, to the fact that my sample includes individuals who are employed by larger and smaller firms and I find an effect on earnings among employees of these larger firms (discussed below). These results also indicate that mental distress is associated with lower earnings, both conditional on employment (column 3) or unconditionally (column (6) and these reductions are significant. At the mean level of distress, my results imply a 31% reduction in annual earnings, which is consistent with, but larger than, previous estimates of the association between earnings and mental illness (Bartel and Taubman, 1979, 1986; Chatterji et al., 2007; Ettner et al., 1997) . However, parity mandates go a long way towards narrowing this gap, more than halving the negative association between mental distress and earnings in all of the weighted estimates. Using the estimates in column (3), a parity mandate is associated with a 16% increase in wages for clinically distressed individuals and accounting for labor force entry (column 6) yields even larger estimates of the increase in earnings following a parity mandate.
Results for hourly earnings and annual hours worked are similar to the annual earnings results, but estimated less precisely. The implied associations between distress and hourly earnings or hours worked for individuals with clinically significant levels of distress are reductions of 17% and 15%, respectively. Again, larger than the previous literature, but not implausibly outside that range. Rather than relying on the previous literature to gauge the magnitude of these results, one can compare the reduction in earnings associated with significant mental distress (31%) with other wage offsets. For example, Daneshvary and Clauretie (2007) report that insurance coverage reduces annual earnings by twelve to fifteen log points. My results would imply that individuals with clinically significant mental illness reduce productivity by roughly twice the cost of health insurance. In all cases, these results are conditional on being employed, which may select the most productive members of the workforce who are significantly distressed.
The labor market results and, in particular, the Poisson difference-in-difference results can also provide insight into the welfare consequences of mental health benefit mandates. I focus on the Poisson results because they account for both the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply.
Collectively, the reduction in earnings and annual hours worked are indicative of an inward shift in the demand curve. While the effect on hourly earnings does not achieve statistical significance, it is unlikely that there is a significant outward shift of the labor supply curve associated with the mental health benefit mandates, indicating that the mandates reduced social welfare (Summers, 1989) . Table 5 presents estimates of the effect of the parity mandate on annual earnings and hours worked including interactions with variables defining groups based on insurance coverage, employer size, whether an individual is paid by the hour, and demographic characteristics. 23 Below each set of regression results, I also report the adjusted p-value for the sum of the mandate and the groupby-mandate coefficients and the comparable sum for mandate-by-distress and group-by-mandateby-distress. Columns (1) and (2) indicate that mandates have similar associations for individuals with or without insurance coverage, however, the sum of the mandate coefficient in statistically significant-implying that mandates are associated with lower wages and fewer hours worked for individuals with insurance coverage, regardless of source-and the interaction between the mandate and distress is positively associated with wages for individuals with insurance from their employer.
Results on hours worked indicate that there may be an increase in hours worked for more distressed individuals associated with parity mandates for individuals with insurance from any employer, but this effect is not mirrored by an increase in labor supply for individuals with insurance from their own employer. There is also evidence that the association between distress and both earnings and hours worked is weaker for individuals with insurance coverage, which makes intuitive sense-people with insurance should feel better and work longer hours.
Column (3) demonstrates that benefit mandates are only associated with changes in earnings for employees of larger firms, although labor supply may be reduced (at the ten percent level) for employees of smaller firms. This pattern of results is consistent with a shift in employment towards larger firms and previous negative findings (Cseh, 2008) . Column (4) indicates that the association between distress and earnings is more positive after the mandate for employees who were paid by the hour and column (5), which restricts to individuals who insurance coverage from their employer, demonstrates that the parity mandate does not have differential effects by payment method conditional on insurance coverage. Column (6) demonstrates that the effects of the parity mandate on earnings and hours worked were larger for unmarried individuals and column (7) demonstrates that the association between mandates and hours worked varied for women, but not for men, as mental distress varied, which is consistent with the content of parity laws and the epidemiology of mental distress and substance abuse. 24 Table 6 presents results from a falsification exercise in which I replace the actual mandate with a "pseudo-mandate" that takes effect three years before the actual mandate 25 and exclude observations from states and years with a mandate in effect. To the extent that my results are due to pre-existing trends in states that adopt a parity mandate, I should find similar coefficients on the 23 All models include group main effects and all interactions between group, state-type, and four item distress (i.e. the instrument for mental distress).
Specification checks and Falsification Tests
24 Most mental health parity mandates cover disorders such as depression and anxiety, which are more common among women, but not substance abuse, which is more common among men (Kessler et al., 2005) . pseudo-mandate as for my preferred specification in tables 3 and 4. Across a range of specifications, the falsification tests yield estimates that are smaller, in absolute value, than in my main analysis and in almost all cases are not even significant at the ten percent level. In addition, the main effect of distress is similar in both the main analysis and the falsification tests, which is reassuring as well. Table 7 presents a number of specification checks; column (1) repeats my preferred IV specifications from tables 3 and 4 (I use the LPM estimates for discrete outcomes). The remaining columns restrict to those states that changed policy, include state-specific linear time trends, measure distress using a dummy for endorsing any of the six items, omit the demographic controls (but keep the year and state fixed effects), add self-reported health status, add year-by-four item distress trends, or census region-by-four item distress trends, column (9) omits 1998 and 1999, which years may be affected by the federal Mental Health Parity Act. 26 Column 10 reweights the data based on an estimated propensity score, where the propensity score was estimated using time fixed effects, demographic characteristics, and census region as controls. My results are robust to all of the specification checks. (1) and (2) provide, as a benchmark, estimates of the partial correlation between mental distress and my six outcome variables among individuals who live in states that will not adopt a parity mandate until 2002 or later, if ever. These benchmark estimates are virtually identical to the main effect of mental distress in column (3) and do not differ by more than 10% from one another and are, at worst, always within the 95% confidence intervals.
Column (4) disaggregates the four items included in the instrument, which yields an overidentified model. For four of the six outcomes, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified (the two exceptions are for the probability of being employed and the probability of being offered health insurance). Columns (5)- (10) use each of the six items individually as instruments in order to demonstrate the relative stability of my estimates. For most outcomes, the four items included in the instrument yield point estimates that typically vary by a factor of two to one, with sadness often yielding one of the most extreme estimates of the interaction between the mandate and mental distress, while nervousness consistently yields less negative estimates of the main effect across all six outcomes. It is unlikely that endogeneity explains these results since two of the four items that are not included in the instrument are essentially unaffected by the mandate, while one item (sadness) is positively associated with parity mandates (table 2).
Conclusions
This paper evaluates the effect of mandating a health insurance benefit, mental health parity, the requirement that state-regulated insurance plans have equivalent cost-sharing requirements for mental and physical health care, on the labor market. In a standard difference-in-difference specification the parity mandate had no effect on employment or insurance coverage, but individuals who chose to work earned less after the mandate took effect, relative to before. These results are consistent with a reduction in the demand for labor associated with a parity mandate; however, I cannot identify the direction of any shift in labor supply, although the point estimates are consistent with an inward shift in the labor supply curve. Therefore it is likely that these mandates, which took effect between 1998 and 2000, reduced social welfare.
Yet that is not the end of the story. There is a specific group of individuals that was intended to benefit from these mandates-individuals in greater mental distress. When I allow for heterogeneity by mental distress in the association between the mandate and employment, insurance coverage, and other labor market outcomes I find that non-distressed individuals do not appear to value the mandated benefits, but the association between these outcomes, for example employment, is significantly stronger and positive for individuals who are severely distressed. Interpreted in the Summer's framework, the positive association between mandates and all six of my outcomes for more distressed individuals is consistent with an outward shift in the labor demand curve associated with the mandate. Such a shift could occur if, in the absence of the mandate, employers tried to avoid hiring mentally distressed individuals, but after the mandate they did not undertake such steps-this is, in essence, the adverse selection story in which no firm wants to be known as a good place to work if one is mentally distressed unless all firms become good places to work for mentally distressed individuals. Some, but not all of the results I report, are consistent with that explanation.
One should also not interpret these findings too strongly. First, I have no credible instruments for mental distress, hence my results may not reflect the causal effect of distress on insurance coverage or the labor market nor the difference in the causal effect of mental distress caused by introducing a parity mandate. Second, I cannot rule out the possibility that the mandates are, themselves, endogenous and a result of law-makers seeking to address an unmet medical need in their state. However, my results are robust to conventional specification checks and the falsification tests fail in the desired way. Source-Author's analysis of the 1997-2001 National Health Interview Survey Note-Points are regression coefficients from a regression of the listed variable on time since a mandate has been implemented. All models include state-type, month, and year fixed effects. Demographic controls include race/ethnicity, education, age, marital status, and gender. 95% confidence intervals from specification with state fixed effects and demographic controls. Source-Author's analysis of the 1997-2001 National Health Interview Survey. Note-Dependent variable is indicated by row name. Mandate is a dummy variable for living in a state with a parity mandate in effect. Individuals living in a state in the first twelve months that a mandate is in effect are excluded from the sample. Sixitem score is the sum of the scores for the previous six columns, the instrument is the sum of the scores listed as "Included in Instrument". All models include race/ethnicity, education, age, marital status, gender, and state, month, and year fixed effects and are weighted using included NHIS sampling weights. Standard errors clustered on state of residence are in parentheses, p-values in square brackets. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 Estimates reported in columns labeled "Probit" are average marginal effects, calculated using the approach in Ai and Norton (2003) . Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses, for Probit models these standard errors are from 200 block bootstrap replications. All estimates weighted to be representative of the under-65 population in the largest MSAs in the United States, except in column (7). + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (1)- (3) and (8). All samples omit the first twelve months that a mandate is in effect; sample in columns (1)- (3) and (7)- (8) 
(8) )  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV (1) repeats the base specification from tables 3 and 4. Column (2) restricts to individuals living in states that adopt a mandate by 2001; (3) includes state-specific linear time trends; (4) uses a binary indicator for reporting any distress, rather than continuous distress; (5) omits demographic controls; (6) adds self-reported health; (7) includes year by distress trends; (8) includes census-region by distress trends; (9) omits observations from 1998 and 1999; and (10) reweights using the propensity score for living in a state and year with a mandate, using the same covariates except for state-type and state fixed effects as in the main specification. All models include month, year, and state fixed effects and interactions between distress and state type; except for column (5), models also include race/ethnicity, education, age marital status, and gender effects, and interactions between distress and state type (see text). Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses. All estimates weighted to be representative of the under-65 population in the largest MSAs in the United States. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (2) restrict to residents of states without a parity mandate; (3) repeats the base specification from tables 3 and 4; (4) uses all four components of the instrument; (5)-(10) use the individual items to instrument for distress. All coefficients have been multiplied by 100 for ease of viewing. All models include month, year, and state fixed effects and interactions between distress and state type; except for column (5), models also include race/ ethnicity, education, age marital status, and gender, and interactions between distress and state type (see text). Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses. All estimates weighted to be representative of the under-65 population in the largest MSAs in the United States. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
